

8 April 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Intelligence as a Force Multiplier--Meeting with Colonel Kenneth Alnwick, USAF, Director, War Gaming and Simulation Center, NDU, 7 April 1986

1. I met with Colonel Alnwick in his office at the National War College. I said that Andrew Marshall suggested that I contact him in conjunction with the approach to be taken in the study of intelligence as a force multiplier.

2. Alnwick said that in terms of warfighting, intelligence should be thought of as "helping the commander" by providing him with everything that is known about the enemy.* The developers and commanders of military forces don't think of intelligence in any way as substituting for more forces. The role on intelligence is to enhance and increase the efficiency with which military forces are employed..."it's always better to have three more guys shooting."

3. In the area of propaganda, intelligence could function as a force multiplier in the sense that it might encourage the non-participation of military forces in operations against US forces. For example, it could work to create conditions in which Poland might refuse to fight with the Soviets in a European conflict. At lower levels, intelligence could strive to achieve the same goals with guerilla units in a counterinsurgency situation.

4. Alnwick also provided an example of how intelligence might conserve forces. He said he had done a study of Cuba for the Secretary of Defense intended to analyze the combination of sticks and carrots that might result in Castro opting out of any major US-Soviet conflict. If Cuba decided that it wasn't in its interest to get involved in any such conflict--and if the US

*Alnwick drew a chart to illustrate his focus on what he called the "operational" level, as distinct from the "national strategy" and "tactical" levels of warfare. He defined it as the use of available military resources to attain strategic goals within a theater of operations. He said it involved larger unit operations and the planning and conduct of campaigns.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

could know this in advance--then two additional US carrier task forces would be available for use in North Sea operations. This would also strengthen deterrence because more powerful forces could be concentrated in areas where conflict was likely to take place. Alnwick said that in this example the Intelligence Community could be very helpful in defining the sticks and carrots that might achieve the desirable results.

5. Alnwick said that a sure way of winning opposition to the study from the community of operators and force developers is to take an approach that attempts to demonstrate that intelligence can substitute for additional forces. He further counselled that I use a "murder board" in developing the TOR--i.e., gather a dozen or so knowledgeable (and congenial) people to take their shots at what is proposed. The results are likely to be a "tighter" and better organized study.



STAT

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Meeting with Colonel Kenneth Alnwick, USAF, Director, War Gaming and
Simulation Center, NDU, 7 April 1986

Distribution

1 - VC/CIPC

1 - ES/CIPC

1

1

1 - CIPC/Subj

1 - CIPC/Chrono

STAT

DCI/ICS/CIPC

(8 Mar 86)

STAT

UNCLASSIFIED